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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

CALVIN H. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
CORNWALL WAREHOUSE
COMPANY and
ERNEST JAMES,

Case No. 9'9'21

Defendants-Respondents.

RESPONDEN'T'S BRIEF
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S'TATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries and
property dam'age arising from an intersection collision at Second South and Third West in Salt Lake
City, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court 1after acknowledging it erred
in the instructing of the jury (R. 51) granted: (a)
Defendant's Motion for a Judgment of Non-Suit,
and (b) Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Jury
Verdict and for a Judgment in favor of the Defendants, Non Obstante Veredicto (R. 87 & R. 88).
Further, the lower court denied the defendant's
Motion for1a New Trial (R. 88).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants want the judgment affirmed.
However, if the judgment of the lower court is not
affirmed, then the lower court should be directed
to grant defendant's Motion for a New Trial.
STATEMENT OF MA'TERIAL FACTS
The appellant's Statement of Facts is incomplete.
The accident happened at a:bout 4 :45 P.M. on
May 31, 1962, at the intersection of 2nd South and
Third West in Salt Lake City (R. 105). The weather
was dry and clear ( R. 105) and the blacktop was
2
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dry ( R. 106) . The streets at this intersection are
level ( R. 125).
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 shows that this intersection, 2nd South Street, is 92' 2" wide from curb
to curb west of Third West, and that Third West is
approximately the same width at the intersection,
being 91' 5" wide from curb to curb. Exhibit No.
1 was prepared and drawn by Officer Nicholson who
was called as the plaintiff's witness and is drawn
to a scale of 1" = 10 feet (R. 110). A stop sign is
located 24' 6" north of the north curb of 2nd South
to control traffic entering the intersection from the
north.
In the course of his investigation Officer Nicholson determined that the point of impact occurred
56' 2" south of the north curb of 2nd South and
77' 10" east of the west curb of Third West, (Exhibit No. 1) . The large dot on Exhibit No. 1 indicates the point where Officer Nicholson determined
the impact between the vehicles occurred ( R. 113).
After the impact Officer Nicholson found ~hat the
truck had moved easterly 20' 7" and that Mr. Johnson's automobile had been moved so that no measurements as to the distance it had traveled could be
taken (R. 129). However, Exhibit No. 1 shows the
path ~ll'. Johnson's vehicle traveled after the impact across the intersection and to where it came
to rest in the northeast quadi'!a.nt of the intersection.
Exhibit No. 4, an aerial photograph, depicts
3
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the intersection from the air and clearly shows it
to be an unobstructed intersection. Officer Nicholson testified the view of each driver toward the
other W1as open ( R. 117) , and that the little building
used as a watch building did not obstruct the view
of the drivers (R. 117 and R. 118). Officer Nicholson also said that the curb on the west side of Third
West north of the intersection was painted red, and
that this was a "No Parking" area, so that parked
cars next to the curb would not be in a position to
interfere with the drivers' vision (R. 117).
On examination Mr. Johnson, the plaintiff,
stated (R. 208) there were no obstacles which would
have kept him from seeing Mr. James' red truck.
Officer Nicholson testified that 1at 'the time of the
accident Mr. J·ohnson told him his vehicle was three
feet away from the truck when he first observed
it (R. 118), and on further examination, Officer
Nicholson said Mr. Johnson said he did not see the
truck before his distance of danger which was three
feet ( R. 1'28). Prior to the trial Mr. Johnson's
deposition was taken, and in the deposition and on
cross examination Mr. Johnson told everyone that
as he approached the intersection, he saw the truck
stopped at the stop sign when his vehicle was 150'
to 200' west of the west curb of Third West, (R.
209). Exhibit No. 1 was marked with a rectangular
box under the words, "Left Only" at the west edge
of 'the Exhibit, and in this rectangul1ar box were inserted the letters, "PO" for point of observation, to
1

4
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show the point of observation at the time of the
deposition ( R. 209). At the trial on direct examination from Mr. Hunt, Mr. Johnson testified that he
saw the truck stopped at the stop sign with other
traffic when he was a:bout 75' west of the west curb
of Third South, and to assist Mr. Johnson, Mr. Hunt
placed a black horizontal mark (R. 141) on Exhibit
No. 1 to show the new observation point at the time
of trial.

Prior to the collision Mr. Johnson was driving in
'nn easterly direction on 2nd South in the inside

through lane (R. 105) at a speed of 20 to 2'5 m.p.h.
(R. 118). Further, he stated his brakes were all
right (R. 241) and that prior to the impact he did
not apply his brakes (R. 210). Mr. Johnson claimed
to be an experienced driver (R. 21'3) and that he
had good reflex action such as any normal pe~son
(R. 213) and that if he had seen the truck he could
have stopped his vehicle in 75 feet (R. 2'14). He
did not slow his vehi'Cle as he entered the in tersection, and he told Officer Nicholson that his speed
was 20 to 25 m.p.h. (R. 118), and that he did not
see the danger of collision with the truck until he
was three feet from it, and did not see the truck
before his distance of danger of three feet ( R. 1'28) .
On lookout ~and observation (R. 229) Mr. Johnson testified as follows:
''Q. Well, would it be correct to say that
your car was approximately 200 feet· west of
the west curb of 3rd South - or excuse me 5
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of 3rd West when you saw his truck stopping
at the stop-sign?"
"A. Wen, I wouldn't know whe,ther it
was 200 feet.
"Q. Well, would it be 150 more nearly
or 250 feet?
'

"A. Well, I dare say it would be somewhere around 150 to '200 feet.
"Q. At "that time you were driving
twenty to twenty-five miles an hour?
"A. Right.
"Q.
lane?

And in the inside eastbound traffic

"A. Inside eastbound traffic lane.
''A. From that time until the collision
occurred did you see 'Mr. James' truck again?
"A. No, sir, I did not.
"Q. What color of truck was he driving?
"'A. Red truck."
Mr. Johnson had no re'al opportunity to observe
the speed of the defendant's truck and testified (R.
231) thaJt he did not know the speed of the defendant's truck.
Mr. James, the defendant truck driver, testified he stopped his truck in the inside southbound
lane on Third West, and that he stopped north of
the crosswalk. Mr. James marked Exhibit No. 14
(R. 249) to show where he stopped 1and that the
front of his truck was north of the crosswalk. Mr.
6
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James waited at the stop sign for six or seven cars
going west to cross the intersection and waited perhaps for a period of four or five seconds ( R. 249).
Mr. James said traffic was pretty heavy ( R. 250),
and that ·when he saw a break in it, he started out.
Before starting out Mr. James observed Mr. Johnson's car 150' to 200' west of the west curb of Third
\Yest ( R. 250). There were no vehicles stopped or
parked to the right of Mr. James' truck ( R. 251) .
Mr. James proceeded in the truck into the inter~
section using third gear ( R. 252) and did not see
the danger of a collision prior to the collision ( R.
~52). Mr. James started out from "0" m.p.h., and
at the time of the impact he said his truck was going
8 or 9 m.p.h. on direct examination (R. 252); however, on cross examination Mr. James admitted that
his truck was going 8, 9, or 10 m.p.h. at the time of
collision.

By stipulation of counsel, Exhibit No. 15 was
received in evidence (R. 2'64). Exhibit No. 15 is
a chart prepared by Sam Taylor, former Salt Lake
City Traffic Engineer. This chart was prepared
for the Utah Safety Council. To make Sam Taylor's
chart applicable to the problem, it was stipulated
by counsel that the coefficiency of friction on the
roadway in question at the time in question was 45
per cent ( R. 266). The Utah Safety Council chart
shows, at a speed of 20 m.p.h., using 34 of a second
reaction time, the plaintiff's vehicle would have traveled 22' during the reaction time period, and that
7
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with merely passable brakes it would have traveled
30 additional feet during the braking period, and
that the total stopping distance would have been
52 feet. Further, the same chart shows, using 3;4
of a second reaction time, at 25 m.p.h., Mr. Johnson
would have traveled 2'7¥2 feet during the reaction
time period, and with merely passable brakes, 47
feet would have been required to brake to a stop,
and that the total stopping distance should not have
exceeded 74lf2 feet. It is to be recalled that Mr.
Johnson testified he did not apply his brakes (R.
2'10) and that his brakes were all right (R. 241).
Officer Nicholson, the investigating police officer, is a g11aduate of the University of Utah (R.
116). He testified that he found no brake marks by
either vehicle prior to the collision (R. 113). Further, while testifying for the plaintiff as plaintiff's
witness, Mr. Hunt, the plaintiff's attorney, asked
Officer Nicholson's expert advice as to the cause of
the accident (R. 114) and was told it occurred because neither driver saw the other. Even Mr. Johnson adm'itted (R. 208) that there was no ·dbstacle
which would have kept him from seeing Mr. James'
truck.
A verdict was returned for the plaintiff, because in the instructions the Trial Court erred prejudiciously in the giving of two instructions, or in
failing to instruct tha:t the plaintiff was negligent
as a matter of law in failing to keep a proper lookout. 'The Court (R. 48) instructed thaJt the defend8
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ant was negligent as a matter of law in not keeping a proper lookout 1and entering the intersection
at a time when it was not safe to enter, and then
handicapped the race in favor of the plaintiff by
giving Instruction 9-L (R. 51) saying the fact the
defendant was involved in a collision was prima facie
evidence that the plaintiff had the right-of-way._
\Vith regard to Instruction 9-L, It is to he noted
(R. 51) that after the return of the verdict, the
trial judge acknowledged in writing on Instruction
9-L he committed error in giving this instruction.
However, the trial court was convinced the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law
in not keeping a proper lookout and not yielding ~he
right-of-way (R. 87 and R. 88), and it did not grant
a new trial to the defendants and their Motion for
a New Trial was denied (R. 87 and R. 88).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING TO KEEP
A PROPER LOOKOUT THE PLAINTIFF'S CON'TRIBUTARY NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CAUSED
THE ACCIDENT.

This ~accident occurred at an unobstructed intersection. The view of each driver toward the other
was open ( R. 117) . Mr. James, the defendant truck
driver, was driving a large red truck (R. 208, R.
229, and R. 230). Mr. Johnson stated there was no
obstacle which would have kept him from seeing the
truck Mr. James was driving (R. 208). The p~ain9
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tiff's attorney, Mr. Hunt, on direct examination of Officer Nicholson, asked the officer
why the accident occurred (R. 114) and was told
it happened because neither driver saw the other.
After the accident Mr. Johnson told Officer Nicholson he did not see the truck until he Wlas three feet
from colliding with it (R. 118 and R. 128). Mr.
Johnson admitted he did not apply his brakes prior
to the accident ( R. 210) . There was no vehicle to
the right of the defendant's truck to hide it (R. 251).
Mr. James stopped his truck north of the crosswalk,
(Exhibit 14) and proceeded into the intersection
turning east when he was 8' or 10' north of the center line of 2nd South Street (R. 254). The truck
was in third gear at the time of the collision ~and
reached a speed not exceeding 10 m.p.h. according
to Mr. James at the time of the collision (R. 252).
Mr. James came from a complete stop, having waited for six or seven cars to pass before entering the
intersection ( R. 24 9) . Mr. Johnson admitted he did
not know the speed of the defendant's truck (R.
231), and on direct examination of Officer Nicholson by Mr. Hunt, Officer Nicholson told Mr. Hunt
he believed the truck stopped before entering the
intersection (R. 115).
It is 80' from the north edge of the crosswalk
to the point of impact on a straight line. In other
words, the front of the truck when stopped was 80'
from the point of impact. In actuality, the truck
entered the intersection going southward until it
10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was 8' or 10' north of the center of the street, and
th(ln turned easterly, and the actual distance traveled by the 'truck would have been in excess of 80
feet. Mr. James' average speed in entering the intersection, starting from "0" m.p.h. and going to a
maximum of 10 m.p.h. would have been 5 m.p.h.
At 5 m.ph. the truck was traveling 7.3'5 feet per
spcond, and it would have taken the truck over 10
seconds to reach the point of impact from the time
the entry to the intersection started. In other words
Mr. Johnson had a:t least ten seconds in which to
observe the danger of a collision, but did nothing
about observing it until he was three feet from the
point of impact and at a time when he had something less than 'a split second in which to observe
the danger of a collision.
At the time Mr. Johnson observed the danger
of a collision, he was going 20 to 25 m.p.h. (R. 2'28).
In the split second in which Mr. Johnson observed the danger, he did not have time to brake
and could not avoid a collision.
Under these circumstances, would all reason'able men believe Mr. Johnson was keeping a proper
lookout? It is the defendant-respondents' contention
that in failing to observe the danger for ten seconds
while driYing his vehicle toward ·and entering an
intersection, Mr. Johnson was negligent as a matter
of law.
In Bemon vs. The Denver & Rio Grande Westetn Railroad Co. (19'55) 4 Uta:h 2d 38, 286, P. '2d
11
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790, where the plaintiff testified he was going 15
m.p.h. and that he could not see more th'an 30 feet
and where in the ordinary reaction time the plaintiff'
during% of a second would h'ave 'traveled 16% feet
before brakes were applied and would have required
at least ·an addftional1'8 feet of braking distance, or
a total stopping distance of 34lf2 feet, this court reversed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, saying
the jury could not have found from a preponderance of the evidence that he could have stopped when
the plaintiff testified he did not see the train until
the moment of impact and did not apply his brakes
because he did not have time to apply his brakes.
It is argued that our sitUJation is much the
same, and that in fact, the plaintiff in the Benson
case was more observant than Mr. Johnson in this
case. Mr. Johnson testified he could have stopped in
7'5 feet (R. 214), but from his point of observation
of the danger, he Wlas only three feet from the collision. According to Mr. Johnson's testimony, he needed an additional 72 feet in which to stop his vehicle
and avoid a collision. Either Mr. Johnson did not
look for traffic entering the intersection or didn't
heed what he saw unless he saw nothing. In any
event, I submit Mr. Johnson's failure to keep a
proper lookout made it impossible for him to stop
within the 11ange of his vision.
In Dalley vs. Midwestern Dairy Products Company (1'9'32) 80 Utah 3'31, 15 P. 2d 309, this court
stated:
12
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"In this jurisdiction the doctrine is established that it is negligence as a m'atter of law
for a person to drive an automobile upon a
tt~a.veled public highway, used by vehicles and
pedestrians, at such a rate of speed 'that said
automobile cannot be stopped within the distance at which the operator of said car is able
to see objects upon the highway in front of
him."
In Benson vs. Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad Co., supra., Shiba vs. Weiss ( 195'5) 3 Utah
2d 256, 282 P. 341, Hirschbach vs. Debuque Packing Company (1957) 7 Utah 2d 7, 316 P. 2d 319
this court has indicated it is still committed to the
rule announced in Dalley vs. Midwestern Dairy Prodllcts Company, supra.
In Johnson vs. Syme (19'57) 6 Utah 2d 319, 313
P. 2d 468, where the plaintiff failed to see a vehicle
entering the intersection until it was directly in
front of her, at a distance of 20 to 30 feet away, at
a time when the car entering the intersection was
going 10 to 20 m.p.h., 1a summary judgment in favor
of the defendant was affirmed, and the court said
that in failing to see the decedent's vehicle until
she was 20 or 30 fe~t from it, she was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law and thlat she either
looked and failed to see the obvious or failed to look
at all, and that under either circumstance she was
negligent as a matter of law.
In this case Mr. Johnson did not observe the
danger of a collision until he was three feet from
13
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the point of impact. Plaintiff Johnson in Johnson
vs. Syme observed the danger when she was 20 to
30 feet from the point of impact, and it would appear that she was more observant th'an Mr. Johnson
here in that she saw the danger when she was 20
or 30 feet away, and he saw it when he was only 3
feet away.
In Conklin vs. Walsh, (1949) 113 Utah 276,
193 P. 2d 437, this court said the duty to keep a
proper lookout applies as well to the favored as to
the disfavored driver, and that neither can excuse
his own faillure to observe because the other driver
failed in his duty, and neither is excused for want
of diligence or failure to see what is plain to be seen.
Certainly the red truck the defendant was driving was something plain to be seen if the automobi'le the plaintiff was driving was something to be
seen. On the basis of either size or color, it should
have been easier for the plaintiff, Mr. Johnson, to
have seen the truck than for Mr. James to have seen
Mr. Johnson's automobile.
In Martin vs. Ehlers ( 1962) 13 Utah 2d 236,
271 P. 2d 851, where the jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff and judgment was entered thereon,
this court reversed the judgment when the plaintiff
admitted he neither saw the officer's red warning
light nor did he hear the siren. The court said in
Martin vs. Ehlers, supra.:
"Plaintiff said he neither saw the officer's red warning light, which was attached
14
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to the right side at the bottom of the officer's
windshield, nor did he hear the siren, although
his window was down. That he saw no red
light on the officer's car seems credible in the
light of what may have been a vision obstruction due to the southbound lines of cars stopped for the traffic light, but his testimony
tha:t he did not hear the siren, taxes one's
in1agination. One of our problems is whether,
under the circumstances here, and as a matter
of law, plaintiff had the means of hearing but
did not hear, or having heard, carelessly did
not heed that which everyone else in the vicinity see1ns to have heard and heeded. We think
he 'vas negligent as a matter of law under the
reasonable, prudent man principle, and that
he cannot be inoculated against the principle's
implications by the simple statement that he
did not hear what appears to have been audible
to others at the scene, particularly to two
complete strangers who volunteered to attest
to such fact. Were we to espouse any theory
that one is immune from his actions simply
because he asserts that he did not hear anything as audible as a police siren within a few
hundred feet at mos!t, it would be to favor
the hard of hearing as against the normal, and
would fracture the traditional standard of
care attributed to the reasonable, prudent man
concept. Even with such imperfections as that
doctrine might possess, and cognizant of the
fact that the jury system does not always
function in perfection, those legal materials
have gone to fashion the best yardsticks that
have contributed to law and order, in our
opinion.
"With great deference to our jury sys15
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~em! and with recognition that we sometimes
Inchne to .approach I?a:tters ~phoristically, we
m~st . review cases In the h~h t of the legal
principles we espouse and discard reverence
for a fact-finding agency, where we are convinced it has erred. Here, we believe, is a case
where that rather rare occasion must be met
with reversal and without equivocation."

In this case Mr. Johnson's vision was not obstructed by other vehicles, and neither he nor anyone else has offered any suggestions as to why he
did not observe the danger sooner.
The appellant in h:is brief suggests that the case
of Williams vs. Zion's Cooperative Mercantile Institution ( 19'57) 6 Utah 2d 283, 31'2 P. 2d 564 is controlling, and that the case is beyond this possibility of
distinction on the facts. With that proposition the
respondents disagree and submit this case can be
distinguished from the facts of the Williams case,
supra. In this case the driver going from the stop
sign had to go 80', and it took him a period of 10
seconds to cover that distance, and at the same time
at the plaintiff's most favorable speed of 20 m.p.h.,
the plaintiff's vehicle was traveling 29.4 feet per
second or would have been 294 feet away from the
point of collision. In the Williams case the driver
coming from the stop sign came in from the right,
and the plain tiff observed the truck stopped when
it was only 40' away. It took the plaintiff only ll/2
seconds to reach the point of impact in the Williams
case, and in this case the plaintiff had 10 seconds
16
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in which to observe the danger and failed to do so.
In actuality, the appellant in his brief is trying to
convince this court in citing the Williams case as
authority that 11/2 seconds equals 10 seconds. The
respondents submit the aforegoing proposition is
not a reasonable one and should be rejected.
In n·illiarru; vs. Zion's Cooperative Mercantile
ln~titntion, supra., the plaintiff's point of observation was 25 feet north of the north edge of the intersection as the plaintiff was driving southward.
Third Avenue was 30 feet wide, and "B" Street was
40 feet wide. In other words, in the Williams vs.
Zion's Cooperative Mercantile Institution case, supra., the point of observation was made within 25
feet of entering a narrow intersection, while in this
case the point of observation was between 1'50 and
200 feet west of the west curb of Third West, and we
have 'a situation in which plaintiff's vehicle traveled
as much as 277' 10" to reach the point of impact as distinguished from the Williams case in
which the plaintiff's vehicle traveled 43 feet.
Further, the appell'ant in his brief misstates
and misleads the court in that Mr. Johnson admitted
he did not know the speed of the defendant's
truck, and that he saw it only 3 feet before impact.
Obviously, in the distance in which he made an observation he had no chance to reach ~any judgment
or judge the speed of the truck involved. A complete
review of the record will show that there are many
inconsistencies in the plain tiff's testimony as to
17
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when he first made his observations and as to what
he did. However, it is firmly established in this State
that a party who testifies on his own behalf is not
entitled to go to the jury on an issue unless that
portion df his own testimony which is least favorable to his contentions is of such a character as will
sustain a verdict in his favor on the issue.
In Alvarado vs. Tucker (1954) 2 Utah 2d 16,
268 P. '2d 986, where an action was brought against
a defendant, and at the trial,at the conclusion of the
plaintiff's evidence the action was dismissed, and
where upon appeal it was contended that the evidence would support a finding that the defendant
was speeding, the zone speed being 25 m.p.h., and an
experienced police officer testifying on direct examination that the speed was 2'5 to 30 m.p.h., this court
held that from such testimony a jury could not find
from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was traveling in excess of '25 m.p.h. In other
words a choice of probabilities creates only a basis
for conjecture, on which 'a verdict cannot s'tand 'and
does not meet the requirement of a preponderance
of the evidence. A witnesses' testimony on direct
examination is no stronger than his modified
examination, or by his c r o s s examination, and
a particular part of his testimony may not be
singled out to the exclusion of other parts of equal
importance on the subject.
In Fowler vs. Pleasant Valley Coal Company
( 1898) 16 Utah 348, 52 P. 594 this court said:
1
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"If there is a contradiction, it arises from
the plaintiff's own testimony. In such 1a case,
where a non-suit is asked, the trial court may
consider such testimony true as bears most
strongly against the interest of the plaintiff."
In Benson vs. Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad Co., supra, this court affirmed it was
committed to the rule of Fowler vs. Pleasant Valley
Coal Company.
In this particular case the defendant-respondents argue that from the plaintiff's own testimony,
he has admitted at the time he made his initial observation (R. 229), his vehicle was 150' to 200' west
of the west curb of Third West, and that although
duting the trial he endeavored to move his point of
observation ahead, in reviewing this testimony from
the plaintiff, you may consider the evidence as to
the point from which his initia~l observation was
made as most strongly bears against the plaintiff.
Further, with regard to the speed of the defendant's
truck, he admitted he did not know its speed and
that he only had three feet in which to observe the
danger. In other words he did not have sufficient
time to react and form 'a judgment as to its speed.
\Ye submit tha:t nothing in the record justifies the
speed on the part of the truck in excess of 10 m.p.h.
at the time of collision. Further, since the plaintiff
admits his speed may have been as much as 25 m.p.h.
as he approached the intersection, in reviewing this
matter this court may consider the plaintiff's testi-.
mony true as bears most strongly against the plain19
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tiff's interests. In other words, this court may assume the plaintiff's vehicle iapproached the intersection at a speed of 25 m.p.h., and that in actuality,
1fue plaintiff's vehicle 10 seconds prior to the collision was 367lj2 feet west of the point of impact, and
not merely 2'94 feet west, which would have been
the distance the plaintiff's vehicle would have covered at only 20 m.p.h.
In summary it would appear from tlhe facts.
the plaintiff was not keeping any lookout, and that
he assumed, merely because he was on an arterial
street, that he had an absolute right-of-way and no
obligation to keep a lookout for traffic in or entering the intersection.
POINT II.
AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING TO YIELD
THE RIGHT-OF-WAY THE PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CAUSED
THE AOCIDENT.

The evidence is clear and certain to the effect
that the defendant entered the intersection ahead of
the plaintiff. Before enter-ing the intersection it is
undisputed th:at Mr. James, the truck driver, made
!a complete stop and that he waited at the stop sign
for six or seven cars going west to pass across the
intersection, and for a period of maybe five seconds
(R. '249). At the time of the collision Mr. James'
speed was no more than 10 m.p.h. ( R. 252). On a
str'aight line (Exhibit No. 1) it shows that the distance from the north edge of the crosswalk to the
20
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point of impact is 80 feet. Further, it is undisputed
that Mr. James drove southward straight ahead
and that he did not start his t u r n u n t i 1 he
was 8' or 10' north of the center line of 2nd South
Street ( R. 254) . Therefore, in actuality the distance
the truck traveled from the place where it started
ahead to the point of collision was somewhat further than 80 feet. Mr. James' ave~age speed would
have been 5 m.p.h. He started art '"0" and reached
the maximum of 10 m.p.h. At 5 m.p.h. his vehicle
was going 7.35 feet per second, and it is certain that
it would have taken the truck sTightly more than
10 seconds from the time it started ahead until
the time of the impact.
Mr. Johnson's speed going east on 2nd South
was from 20 to 25 m.p.h. At 25 m.p.h. his vehicle
was gding 36.75 feet per second, or in ten seconds
at that speed the Johnson vehicle was '36'7 .5 feet
from the point of collision. Even if you assume the
speed of Mr. Johnson's vehicle was only 20 m.p.h.,
his vehicle, nevertheless, would have been going 29.4
feet per second !and was 294 feet from the point of
imJ>act at the time of the entry.
In Richards vs. Anderson (1959) 9 Utah 2d
1i, 337 P. 2d 59, this court held the plaintiff on
an arterial highway contributorily negligent as a
matter of llaw where the defendant driver had waited at the entrance to an intersection and allowed
other cars to go by, and thereafter had proceeded
38 feet into the intersection reaching a speed of
21
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10 m.p.h. or an 1average speed of 5 m.p.h., and where
the driver entering the arterial was traveling 7lf2
feet per second, and where five seconds elapsed time
occurred from the time the driver. started into the
i'ntersection to the time of the collision, and where
at that time the driver on the arterial Wlas approaching at 15 to 20 m.p.h. and where the driver on the
arterial was going 15 m.p.h., he would have been
going 2'2¥2 feet per second and would h'ave travelled
112¥2 feet, !and where during % of a second in reaction time at 15 m.p.h. the vehicle on the arterial
would have traveled 16¥2 feet and would have required 18 feet for stopping with passable hr3:kes,
or a total stopping di stlance of 34¥2 feet, and where
substracting that distance from 1121;2 feet, it was
found that the plaintiff has a margin of safety in
stopping of 78 feet. Further in thiat case the court
noted that for any increase in the person's speed
on the arterial, that his opportunity to stop increased
proportionately.
1

By stipulation Exhibit No. 15 was received (R.
264). Exhibit No. 15 in this case was identical with
the chart prepared by Traffic Engineer S. S. Taylor
and published by the Utah Safety Council. Exhibit
No. 1'5 shows that at a speed of 20 m.p.h. using%,
of a second reaction time, the plaintiff's vehicle
would have traveled 22 feet during the reacfion time
period and with merely paS'sable brakes, an additional 30 feet would have been required for stopping,
or the total stopping distance would have been 52
1
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feet. Subtracting 52 feet from 294 feet, the distance
a vehicle will travel in 10 seconds going 20 m.p.h.,
you come up with a margin of safety of 242 feet.
It is evident that even 'at 20 m.p.h. Mr. Johnson's
margin of safety in stopping was 24'2 feet or more
than three times the margin of safety that Mr.
Richards enjoyed in Richards vs. Anderson, supra,
where Richards was held contributorily negligent
as a matter of law. At 25 m.p.h. using 3;4 of a second
reaction time, the chart shows that Mr. Johnson
would have traveled '27lj2 feet during the reaction
time period, 1and fuat with merely passable brake'S
he would have required 47 feet to brake to a stop,
and that his total stopping distance would have been
7-l~,S feet. Again, using Sam T·aylor's chart, Exhibit 15, with a stipulated coefficiency of friction of
45 per cent (R. 266), we find that 'in 10 seconds at
25 m.p.h. Mr. Johnson's vehi·cle would have traveled
367 ~ ~ feet, and tha1t his total braking and stopping
distance required with merely passable brakes would
have 'been 741f2 feet 1and that he had a margin of
safety in stopping of 2'9'3 feet. Further, since the
choice of proba:bilities as to Mr. Jdhn'son's speed
comes from Mr. John'son's own testimony, the court
in reViewing this case in en'ti tied to weigh and interpret the evidence as to his speed in the light most
unfavorable to Mr. Johnson. In Fowler vs. Pleasant
Valley Coal Company, supra, Benson vs. the Denver
& Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, supra,
and A.lvarado vs. Tucker, supra, ~his court held that
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where the contradiction arose from the plaintiff's
own testimony, the trial court may consider such
testimony as bears most strongly against the interests of the plaintiff.
In Hickock vs. Skinner (1948) 11'3 Utah 1, 190
P. 2d 514, where the plaintiff was traveling north
on West Temple in Salt Lake City, and at the intersection of 2'1st South and West Temple collided with
the defendant who was going west on 21st South,
and Where the plaintiff admitted he saw the defendant's vehicle 400 to 500 feet e'ast at the time
he left the stop sign to cross 21st South, and there1after proceeded without looking to the east again,
and where 2'1st South was 63 feet wide and the
block along 21st South which the defendant was
traveling was 660 feet long, and the point of impact was 18 feet south of the north curb of 21st
South and 9 feet west of the east curb of West
Temple and 65 feet north from the stop sign facing
21st South by which the plaintiff entered the intersection, and where the police officer testified the
defendant was going 45 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone,
and where there were no skid marks, and Where
the court said if the distance were 400 feet the defendant had to travel, going at a speed of 45 m.p.h.,
for a period of time of six seconds to reach the point
of collision, and if it were a distance of 500 feet
it would have taken 71;2 seconds for the defendant's
car to reach the point of impact from the time it
left the stop sign, and the defendant's car was not
1
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so close as to constitute an immediate ha21ard, and
that, therefore, the driver on the arterial was required to yield the right-of-way to the driver entering.
Obviously, Hickock vs. Skinner, supra, is authority to the effect that if 1a car on the arterial is between six and seven and one-half seconds away from
the point of impact at the time the other vehicle
leaves the stop sign, it is not so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. Richards vs. Anderson,
supra, is authority that if a vehicle on the arterial
is five seconds away from the pdint of impact !at
the time the vehicle leaves the stop sign, it is not
so close as to constitute an immediate hazard; so
it would appear tha:t 1as a matter of law in this case
where the plaintiff, Calvin Johnson, was 10 seconds
away from the point of impact at the time our truck
proceeded into the intersection, the plaintiff's vehicle was not so close 1as to constitute an immediate
hazard, and that Mr. Johnson could have made a
safe and smooth stop if he had 'been looking, and
that he had a duty to yield the right-of-way.
In Bates vs. Burns ('1955) 3 Utah 180, 281 P.
2d 290, where the evidence showed the plaintiff
stopped at a stop sign 12·5 feet south of the point
of impact and 'then proceeded northerly into the 'intersection and thereafter collided wi fu a westbound
,,.ehicle on Highway 91 at the 'intersection of Highway 114 in Pleasant Grove, Utah, and where the
evidence showed the plain tiff proceeded at a speed
25
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of 5 to 6 m.p.h. from the stop sign to the center of
the highway, and where in fact the plaintiff not only
entered the intersection first but had nearly passed
over it before the defendant entered, the court said
the plaintiff was the disfavored driver until he had
entered the intersection at a time when no car on
the through highway had entered or wa:s so close
as to constitute an immediate hazard, but having
entered 1as authorized, he 'became the favored driver,
and all other vehicles approaching the intersection
on said through highway were obliged to yield the
righ't-of-way to him.
Section 4'1-6-7 4 a:s amended in 1961, Utah Code
Annotated, reads as follows:
4'1-6-7 4. Vehicle entering a through highway. - "The driver of a vehicle shall stop
as required by this act at the entrance to a
through high,vay 1and shall yield the right of
way to other vehicles which have entered the
intersection from said through highway or
Which are approaching so closely on said
~hrough highway as to consti tlite an immediate hazard, but said driver having so yielded may proceed and the drivers of all other v~
hicles approaching the intersection on sa1d
highway shall yield the right of way to the
vehicle so proceeding in to or across the
furough highway."
(b) "The driver of a vehicle .shal1likewise stop in obedience to a stop sign as required herein at an intersection where a stop
sign is erected at one or more entrtances thereto although not a part of a through highway
and shall proceed cautiously, yield right of
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way to vehicles not so obliged to stop which
are within the intersection or approaching
so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard, but may then proceed."

The 1961 amendment substitutes the words,
"yield right of way" for the word, "yielding" in
Sub-section (b), and except for this Change, there
has been no modification in Section 41-6-74 since
Bates vs. Burns, supra. w.as decided.
Section 41-6-73, which appellant quotes in his
brief, has no application to the facts or situation
involved in this accident. Section 4'1-'6-73 applies
when the vehicle on the arterial is approaching from
the opposite direction. In this case, Mr. James was
going south and Mr. Johnson was going ea;st, and
. south is not opposite to east, and Section 41-6-73 is
not in point.
It would appear &at the appellant wishes to
disregard entirely fue meaning of the words, "or
approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard." In Richards vs. Anderson, supra.,
in reference as to what was an immediate hazard,
it states that if the driver on the :arterial must brake
sharply or suddenly Check his speed to avoi'd a collision, that he was an immediate hazard to the driver
entering, and illlat conversely if the driver on the
the arterial would not be required to go into a sharp
or sudden braking to avoid a collision, that hi'S car
was far enough away to have a clear margin to
observe and make a sm'ooth and safe stop, and was
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not an immediate hazard, and that he would be
required to yield to the driver already at the intersection.
In summary it is submitted that Mr. James
.
having allowed Mr. Johnson a margin of safety in'
making a smooth and safe stop of 242 feet to 293
feet, was the favored driver, and fulat as a matter
of law Mr. Johnson had to yield the right-of-way.
POINT III.
THE JUDGME·NT FOR THE DEFENDANTS, NON
OBSTANTE VERE'DJCTO, DID NOT VIOLATE ANY
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

If the facts do not support a claim, absence of
proof ~annot be supplied by specu1ation, and this
court has held that granting a juagment of nonsui1t or a directed verdict in favor of a party is not
a denial of a constitutional guaranteed right.
In Raymond vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, ( 1948) 113 Utah '2'6, 191 P. 2d 137, where
tJhe trial court held the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent as a matter of 11aw, this court affirmed
say1ng:
"It has been strenuously argued by plaintiff tHa:t ·fuis deci·sion has deprived him of
his constitutional right to a jury ~rial. Th~t
contention ha:s been urged upon this court m
almost every case of non-suit and directed
verdict brought before us. 'This court is c~arg
ed with the duty of protecting all of the nghts
of an of the litigants. This is especfally true
of those fundamental rights guaranteed by
the State and Federal Constitutions. But the
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right to have a jury pass upon issues of fact
does not include the right to have a cause submitted to a jury in hope of a verdict where
the facts undisputably show that the plaintiff is not en ti tied to relief."
In Creamer vs. Ogden Union Railway Co. &
Depot Co., ( 1952) 121 Utah 406, 242 P ;2d 575,
where the plain tiff con tended fue court could not
reverse judgment in favor of the plaintiff, because
to do so would deny ·plaintiff of a constitutionally
guaranteed jury trial, thi's court held where facts
undisputably estal>lished no right to relief, he had
· no right to have the jury decide the matter.
The Raymond and Creamer cases, supra. follow the view of the United States Supreme Court.
In Moore vs. Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad Company
(1951) 340 U.S. 573, 71 S. Ct. 4'28, 9'5 L. Ed. 547,
the Supreme Court of the United State·s held that
where the fa:cts failed to establish a right to relief,
that there was no right to a jury trial, and that
speculation by the jury could not supply the place
of proof.
In summ·ary tllis argument of plaintiff's counsel merits no further comment.
POINT IV.
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD
STATED.

NOT

BE

REIN-

The Lower Court erred in instructing the jury
that being involved in a collision in an intersection
was prima facie evidence that the plaintiff had the
right-of-way. However, since the Lower Court con29
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eluded as a matter of law the plaintiff was contri
butorily negligent, it did not grant the defendanb
a new trial, but rather granted them a judgmenj
in their favor, Non Obstante Veredicto.
The trial court erred prejudiciously in giving
Instruction 9-F, (R. 48) and Instruction 9-L, (R.
51) . In Instruction No. 9-F the court instructed
as follows:
9-F
"In this action the Court finds that the
defendant stopped at the s'top sign, and then
proceeded in to the intersection of Second
South and Third West, going in a southerly
direction and making a left-hand turn to the
east, wi fuou't keeping a proper lookout for
traffic in the position of the plaintiff, and
at a time when it was not safe for 'him to
enter, and on that ground the Court has
found, as a matter of law, that the defendant
was negligent."
In Instruction 9-F the court said Mr. James was
negligent as a matter of law in not keeping a proper
lookout for traffic in the poSi tion of the pl'aintiff,
and in entering the intersection when i t was not
safe to do so. However, the undisputed testimony
was that Mr. J:ames stopped his truck (R. 249) and
that he looked toward the west and saw the plaintiff's vehicle 150' to 200' back from the intersection, (R. 250), and Mr. James started 'into the intersection when he did, as he thought there was no
danger of colliding with Mr. Johnson's vehicle (R.
252). Mr. J:a.mes also observed at the time he saw
1

1
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~ll'. Johnson's vehicle that it was going 20 to 25

m.p.h. ( R. 253), and as such, he thought he could
· safely enter. Instruction 9-F unbalanced the case in
favor of the plaintiff and m:ade it appear to the
jury that the duty of keeping a lookout was on the
part of Mr. James; otherwise, why did the court
'instruct that both drivers were negligent as a matter of law in failing to see each other and failing
to keep a proper lookout. And as a practical matter,
it would appear that Mr. Johnson could have seen
- Mr. James' larger red truck someWhat ea:sier than
Mr. James ·could have seen Mr. Johnson's sm'aller
light colored station wagon.
Instruction 9-L was more damaging to the de~ fendants than :any other instruction, and perh'aps
_ it is the best explanation and alibi as to why the
jury returned a verdict at all in favor of the plaintiff. Instruction 9-L (R. 51) was as follows:
'£1The entry of the defendants into :a highway con trolled by a stop sign and his being
involved in a collision in the intersection, in
this case, is prima facie evidence illlat the
plaintiff had the right-of-way.
"We mean by 'prima facie' that on the
face of it, the plaintiff had ·the right-of-way.
"If you have in addition to the defendant
entering the controlled highway, and being
involved in a collision, additional evidence on
the subject of negligence in failing to yield
the right-of-way, you may find that plaintiff
had a right-of-way, and in tllat event, your
answer would be "False" on No. 1 (b). But
if you have additional evidence that over3'1
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~omes the pri~a facie evidence, then you are
Instructed to f1nd "True" on Proposition No
1 (b)."
.
Section 41-6-7 4.10 reads as follows:
. (a) . In the even.t tha_t a driver, after
havtng drtven past 1a yteld stgn or a stop sign
is in'uolved in a collision with a pedestria~
having right of way in a crosswalk or a vehicle
having right of way in the intersection such
collision shall be deemed prima fiacie evideme
of his failure to yield the right of way as required by this section, but shall not be considered negligence per se in determining legal
liabilitty for such accident.
Instruction 9-L says that the fact a collision
occurred was prima facie evidence the plaintiff
had the right-of-way, and in effect the trial court
told the jury that the driver on the arterial only
had to get hit in a callision to have the right-of-way.
The question of right-of-way depends on Whether
or not the plain tiff's vehicle was so close as to constiltute an immediate hazard and not whether there
is or is not a collision.
At the time the Motion for a New Trial was
argued, you will note that Judge Jeppson placed ·an
'·'X" mark after the word "Section" in Instruction
9-L and added a footnote in his own handwriting to
the effect that he should have instructed that if the
defendants were involved in a collision with a car
having the right-of-way, that would be prima facie
evidence, and his pencil note on the instructoin (R.
51) shows that he concluded he erred in giving this
instruction.
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Inadvertently, in preparing the record for
transmittal to the Supreme Court, the reporter omitted part of the record and failed 'to include all of
the defendants' exceptions to the court's 'instructions. The additional transcript and affidavit were
filed to advise this court that a;t all times defendants
contended the plaintiff was contributorily negligent
as a matter of law in failing to keep a proper lookout and in failing to yield the right-of-way to a ve, hicle Which was so close as to constitute an 'immediate hazard.
In summary it is submitted that the defendants,
having excepted in parti'cular the court's instructions 9-F and 9-L, that fue judgment cannot be reinstated even if it 'be assumed plaintiff is not contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION

The trial court's judgment in favor of the defendants, Non Obstante Veredicto, should be affirm, ed. As a matter of law the plaintiff was contributorily negligent 'in failing to yield the right of way
- to a vehicle which entered the intersection first and
. when he was not so close as to constitute an immediate hazard, and furfuer, as a matter of law the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent in failing to
keep a proper lookout when he failed to observe the
danger of a collision until he was three feet from
colliding wi'th the defendants' vehicle when he was
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entering a wide, unobstructed, intersection in th
daylight.
Respectfully submitted,
RAYMOND M. BERRY,
Attorney for
Defendants-Respondents
203 Executive Building
45'5 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah

I hereby certify that on this ________________ day of
October, 1963, I m'ailed two copies of tllis Brief by
United States mail, postage prepaid, to Gayle Dean
Hunt, and two copies to Dwight L. King at the addresses shown on this Brief.
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